Symmetric pre-commitment
Both parties lock economic stake before settlement becomes possible.
Dual deposits remove the free option to defect and force both sides into a cost-bearing commitment regime.
DeTrust Protocol mechanism guide
Off-chain promise with deterministic on-chain enforcement.
DeTrustPay Protocol (enhanced Double-Deposit Escrow, eDDE) makes completion economically rational and misconduct economically costly, without arbitration.
New user? Start with the basic usage flow first. Learn basics.
Non-custodial Deterministic Transparent
Traditional payments
Trust is assumed
- One party usually acts first and absorbs early risk.
- Disputes depend on off-chain judgment and process delays.
- Failure exposure is often asymmetric.
Traditional escrow
Enforcement is subjective
- Counterparty risk is reduced but not removed.
- Human arbitration remains a critical dependency.
- Final resolution can be costly and slow.
Core principle
DeTrust Protocol/Pay changes incentives, not trust assumptions.
Mechanism architecture
How DeTrust Protocol/Pay enforces credible off-chain commerce
DeTrustPay does not attempt to infer off-chain truth directly. Instead, it redesigns incentives so cooperative completion is structurally rational under deterministic execution.
Enhanced Dual Deposit Escrow (eDDE)
DeTrust Protocol/Pay is an extension of the dual-deposit escrow model, formalized as enhanced Dual Deposit Escrow (eDDE). It keeps symmetric stake commitment, then adds deterministic settlement paths, proposal-based recovery, and explicit on-chain constraints for stronger enforcement.
Deterministic state machine
Transaction state transitions are program-defined and verifiable.
Only valid state transitions can unlock settlement paths. Informal agreements cannot bypass on-chain rules.
Loss-backed enforcement
Misalignment creates direct loss instead of delayed reputational penalties.
The mechanism does not need external arbitration to apply pressure; strategy violations are resolved economically.
Proposal recovery path
When assumptions drift, parties can coordinate on adjusted settlement.
Proposal acceptance creates a bounded recovery path under the same protocol constraints, reducing deadlock risk.
Mechanism contract
What is fixed by protocol vs. defined by parties
Hard rules enforced by protocol
- Funds lock before any protected settlement path is available.
- Settlement requires valid terminal states (for example: confirmed or accepted proposal paths).
- Fees, cancellation pressure, and transfers are computed from deterministic logic.
- Finalized state transitions have no discretionary override.
Terms defined by transaction parties
- Payment amount and deposit sizing within protocol constraints.
- Off-chain fulfillment criteria and acceptable evidence.
- Coordination assumptions for confirmation timing.
- Whether to accept proposal-based settlement adjustments.
Strategic effect
The protocol shifts enforcement from social trust to payoff design.
- Mutual cooperation is the lowest-loss path and completes settlement efficiently.
- Unilateral defection triggers direct loss pressure instead of optional penalties.
- The mechanism converges behavior without relying on identity persistence or social trust.
Mechanism summary: betrayal moves from potentially profitable to predictably loss-bearing under deterministic settlement rules.
Game-theoretic foundations
DeTrustPay changes payoffs before the first move
The protocol does not attempt to replace real-world judgment. It restructures incentives so betrayal paths carry deterministic economic downside and cooperative completion becomes the rational strategy.
Trust problem as a sequential game
Off-chain commerce is usually a two-player sequence with asymmetric exposure.
- Promising party (seller/provider) decides whether to deliver the promised result.
- Promised party (buyer/client) decides whether to confirm fulfillment.
- Delivery carries real cost, while betrayal can be opportunistically profitable in many environments.
- Without structural enforcement, rational agents price in betrayal risk or avoid the transaction.
Why reputation and arbitration stay inefficient
Most legacy controls change payoffs after the game, not before the first move.
- Punishment is probabilistic and typically delayed across support, legal, or platform processes.
- Delayed enforcement is discounted by time and uncertainty, keeping expected betrayal utility positive.
- One-off, pseudonymous, and cross-border interactions weaken reputation carryover.
- Participants compensate by raising prices, requiring over-collateralization, or refusing to transact.
Dual-deposit incentive redesign
DeTrust Protocol/Pay introduces symmetric pre-commitment before protected settlement is available.
- Both parties lock deposits on-chain before entering the protected settlement path.
- Failure to complete agreed outcomes exposes stake to deterministic loss pressure.
- Settlement paths are state-machine constrained and role-aware, not discretion-based.
- Enforcement is structural: the mechanism reshapes incentives before the game starts.
Loss-aversion leverage
The protocol relies on stronger behavioral pressure from guaranteed loss than speculative gain.
- Agents self-discipline when defection creates predictable, immediate downside.
- The protocol does not need to infer off-chain truth perfectly to align strategy.
- It only needs to keep dishonest paths unprofitable under on-chain rules.
- This is effective where delivery evidence is noisy, delayed, or partially subjective.
Payoff matrix under DeTrust Protocol/Pay
Cooperation is the only stable low-loss strategy
This matrix summarizes strategic outcomes for promising party and promised party under dual-deposit enforcement.
Promising party: Deliver | Promised party: Confirm
Transaction completes via valid terminal state and deterministic settlement.
Cooperation is efficient and minimizes expected loss for both parties.
Promising party: Deliver | Promised party: Refuse confirmation
Refusal path remains loss-bearing under protocol pressure and cannot extract privileged upside.
Strategic refusal is dominated by honest confirmation once fulfillment is satisfied.
Promising party: Fail delivery | Promised party: Confirm anyway
Invalid fulfillment does not create a durable profitable bypass under deterministic rules.
Non-delivery cannot become a dominant strategy through subjective manipulation.
Promising party: Fail delivery | Promised party: Refuse confirmation
Mutual defection remains loss-bearing and economically inferior to cooperation.
Deadlock pressure pushes both sides toward recoverable cooperative resolution.
Scalability and investment thesis
Mechanism-first enforcement scales better than trust-first systems
Trust-based systems at scale
- Monitoring cost rises with participant count and transaction diversity.
- Enforcement lag widens as case volume grows.
- Reputation becomes fragmented across platforms and geographies.
- Counterparty risk premiums accumulate and reduce market efficiency.
DeTrust Protocol/Pay enforcement at scale
- Rules remain constant regardless of transaction volume.
- Execution cost stays close to deterministic on-chain operations.
- Marginal enforcement cost approaches protocol-level automation.
- Market participation expands where trust assumptions previously blocked trade.
Investor implications
- DeTrustPay is a mechanism-design primitive, not a narrow marketplace feature.
- Standardized incentive contracts reduce bilateral negotiation and dispute overhead.
- Transactions previously rejected as too risky can move into structured settlement paths.
- Defensibility is economic: copying UI is easier than reproducing incentive equilibrium.
Investor summary: DeTrustPay applies game-theoretic incentive design to off-chain commerce so honest completion is the only rational strategy, without trust, arbitration, or reputation dependency.
Ecosystem revenue destination
Where DeTrustPay revenue goes
DeTrustPay routes 100% of protocol-side revenue to the eeteel revenue pool. This ecosystem destination policy is configured as 10,000 bps (100.00%) and is designed to direct all routed protocol revenue into active eeteel services.
Routing policy: 100.00% to eeteel revenue pool
Routing principles
- 100% of DeTrustPay protocol-side revenue allocation routes to the eeteel revenue pool.
- Routing policy is expressed as 10,000 bps (100.00%) for ecosystem destination flow.
- DeTrustPay settlement guarantees remain unchanged; routing applies to protocol-side revenue, not user principal.
Scope clarity
In scope
- Protocol-side revenue allocation flow configured as 100% (10,000 bps).
- Destination surface routed to eeteel revenue pool control accounts.
Out of scope
- User principal and refundable deposits locked for settlement.
- Assets unrelated to protocol fee collection or routing policy.
Transparency commitments
- Publish destination addresses and transaction references for routed transfers.
- Expose refreshable on-chain proof surfaces for users to verify routing destination.
- Document governance updates immediately if routing parameters are changed.
Lifecycle in DeTrustPay Protocol
Set Terms - Check Fulfillment - Settle On-Chain
Three user-facing steps mapped to protocol stages: Promise, Verification, and Settlement.
Role mapping: promising party usually means seller/provider. Promised party usually means buyer/client.
Step 1
Set Terms
Protocol stage: Promise
What happens: Promising party and promised party agree on payment, deposits, and objective off-chain fulfillment criteria.
Enforced: Funds lock on-chain with symmetric incentives before settlement can begin.
Cannot bypass: Uncollateralized terms cannot move into protected protocol settlement paths.
Step 2
Check Fulfillment
Protocol stage: Verification
What happens: Promised party verifies whether off-chain delivery satisfies the agreed terms.
Enforced: Only protocol-defined confirmations or accepted proposals can transition transaction state.
Cannot bypass: No subjective arbitration layer can force settlement outside program rules.
Step 3
Settle On-Chain
Protocol stage: Settlement
What happens: Funds settle through deterministic smart contract execution and recorded state transitions.
Enforced: Fees, deposits, and transfers execute strictly according to on-chain logic and role constraints.
Cannot bypass: No party can alter terminal outcomes after on-chain finality is reached.
Economic outcomes
Incentive model in DeTrustPay Protocol
Example values: payment 100 USDC, payer deposit 50 USDC, payee deposit 50 USDC.
Honest completion: protocol settles by agreed outcome and deposits return under settlement rules.
Dishonest behavior: refusal or manipulation attempts incur direct deposit loss through deterministic rules.
Formula snapshots
Settlement gate (simplified)Settlement is blocked until a valid confirmation path exists.
can_settle = (status == confirmed) OR (status == proposal_accepted) if can_settle: execute_deterministic_transfers() else: keep_funds_locked()
No settlement path is available outside protocol-defined state transitions.
Payee cancellation fee (simplified)Cancellation pressure increases with elapsed time and is deposit-capped.
elapsed_weeks = floor((now - accepted_at) / WEEK) fee_bps = 500 + elapsed_weeks * 100 raw_fee = original_amount * fee_bps / 10_000 fee_payee = min(raw_fee, payee_deposit)
Fee growth makes indefinite delay increasingly irrational for the cancelling side.
Fair Incentives for Both Parties
- The delivering party remains under on-chain economic pressure until the promised delivery is fulfilled.
- The receiving party is incentivized to confirm delivery once it is fulfilled as promised.
Proposal Path
- Either party may propose adjusted settlement terms under equal protocol rules.
- Fair proposals reduce expected loss for both sides and restore a clear settlement path. Strategic delay or rejection is economically irrational.
- No off-protocol privilege exists after finalization; outcomes remain deterministic.
Usage pattern
Transaction Instance secured by DeTrustPay Protocol
A seller completes a sale through DeTrustPay using symmetric deposits and deterministic on-chain settlement.
Useful when off-chain delivery is hard to monitor continuously and both sides need a credible enforcement bridge.
Step 1: Seller defines payment, deposits, and promised delivery.
Step 2: Buyer accepts the setup, creating a transaction with aligned incentives.
Step 3: Seller delivers; buyer verifies fulfillment off-chain.
Step 4: Buyer confirms fulfillment; settlement finalizes on-chain.
Trust boundaries
Mechanism guarantees and explicit limits
Guaranteed by protocol
Funds remain non-custodial and controlled by program logic.
Execution is deterministic with publicly verifiable state transitions.
Settlement is role-aware and constrained by on-chain conditions.
Not guaranteed by protocol
Protocol does not verify real-world delivery facts automatically.
Protocol does not reverse finalized on-chain transactions.
Protocol does not replace legal or tax obligations for users.
DeTrustPay prioritizes mechanism-first credibility: verifiable state transitions, role constraints, and deterministic settlement paths.